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IN THE COURT O* APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
I 'laintiffi Appellee,
v .,

Case No. 20081065

MICHAEL WILLAM KISSELL,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF A P P E L L A N T

J U R 1 S D 1 C T 1 Q N

Appellant appeals fit oi it i tl i =; tt iial :oi n t's O, • t i i • Di smissin g Petition / hi Po st
Conviction Relief '("Order"), filed on November 24, 2008, denying his Petition for Relief
Under the ; ww-c "nnviction Remedies Act and a Memorandum
v

- •

"' Coi i i /" ztion

in Support of A u\n>h for
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"Petition") in this case involving his convictions in the Seventh Judicial District Court
for tlle County of Grand, State of Utah, for five (5) coimts of Dealing in Material Harmful

Addendum "A" and incorporated herein by this reference.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS STATEMENT OF
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL, AND STANDARD OR REVIEW
ISSU

.Jid the trial court abuse its discretion iti f L t \ tug OH irrelevant
circumstances that it inappropriately deemed as aggravatim? circumstances
in sentencing Kissell?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: This Court "traditionally afford[s] the trial court wide
latitude and discretion in sentencing." State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah,
1997). "An appellate court will set aside a sentence imposed by the trial court if the
sentence represents an abuse of discretion, if the trial judge fails to consider all legally
relevant factors, or if the sentence imposed exceeds the limits prescribed by law." State
v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1989), citing State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887
(Utah 1978), State v. Holland, 777 P.2d 1019 (Utah 1989), and State v. Shelby, 728 P.2d
987, 988 (Utah 1986). "A court abuses its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences
only if no reasonable person would take the view by the sentencing court." State v.
Thorkelson, 2004 UT App 9, 84 P.3d 854.

"A trial court abuses its discretion in

sentencing when, among other things, it fails to consider all legally relevant factors."
State v. Helms. 2002 UT 12, ^|8, 40 P.3d 626 (quoting Gibbons, 779 P.2d at 1135). A
failure to exercise discretion is generally encompassed within the meaning of abuse of
discretion. See United States v. Miller, 722 F.2d 562, 565 (9th Cir.1983) ("[A]s a general
rule, the existence of discretion requires its exercise."); People v. Darlington, 105 P.3d
230, 232 (Colo.2005) ("[F]ailure to exercise discretion is itself an abuse of discretion.").
ISSUE #3: Did the trial court violate Kissell 's due process and equal protection rights
in giving him consecutive sentences?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Due process challenges are questions of law that we
review applying a correction of error standard." Utah Auto Auction v. Labor Com'n,
2008 UT App 293, 1J9, 191 P.3d 1252, citing Color Country Mgmt. v. Labor Comm'n,
2001 UT App 370, ^17, 38 P.3d 969.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE,
On August 27, 2004, Appellant, Michael William Kissell (hereinafter "Kissell"),
was charged by Information in the Seventh Judicial District Court, in and for Grand
County, State of Utah, with forcible sexual abuse, a second-degree felony; thirty-four
(34) counts of dealing in harmful material, all third-degree felonies under UT. CODE ANN.
§76-10-1206, allowing for a separate charge for each article allegedly exhibited; and
contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a Class B misdemeanor. R0013-R0014. On
November 8, 2004, Kissell was charged by Amended Information with forcible sexual
abuse, a second-degree felony; thirty-four (34) counts of dealing in harmful material to a
minor, all third-degree felonies; and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a Class B
misdemeanor. R0014.
On March 1, 2005, Kissell filed his Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty
Plea and Certificate of Counsel, pleading guilty to five (5) separate counts of dealing in
harmful material to a minor pursuant to a plea agreement with the State of Utah
("State"), with the remainder of the charges dismissed pursuant to plea negotiations. Id.
On April 5, 2005, the trial court sentenced Kissell to five (5) zero-to-five (0-5) year terms
to be served consecutively in the Utah State Prison, and entered its Judgment and
Commitment to Utah State Prison (the "Judgment") in this matter. R0029.
On July 14, 2006, Kissell filed a Petition for Relief Under the Post-Conviction
Remedies Act and a Memorandum in Support of Petition for Relief Under the PostConviction Remedies Act, challenging that the trial court had relied upon irrelevant and
unreliable evidence and information in sentencing Appellant to consecutive terms.
3

R0005 and R0013. On October 20, 2006, the trial court entered its Order denying
Kissell's Petition. R0032- R0033. On November 8, 2006, Kissell, timely filed his Notice
of Appeal from the Order denying the Petition. R003 5.
On June 8, 2007, Kissell filed his Brief of Appellant. The Utah Court of Appeals
remanded the appeal, directing the trial court to order the State to respond to the Petition.
On January 21, 2008, the State filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief and Supporting Memorandum (the "Motion to Dismiss") (R0060-R0163). On
March 26, 2008, Kissell filed his Response to the State's Motion to Dismiss Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief and Supporting Memorandum R0164-0179 and, on April 18,
2008, the State filed its State's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief R0180-0186.
On November 7, 2008 the State filed its Notice to Submit State's Motion to
Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction Relief R0186-0188. On November 24, 2008, the
Court filed the Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief which is at issue in
the current appeal. R0189-192 On December 17, 2008, Kissell timely filed his Notice of
Appeal R0193.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On November 8, 2004, Kissell was charged by Amended Information with forcible
sexual abuse, a second-degree felony; thirty-four (34) counts of dealing in harmful
material to a minor, all third-degree felonies; and contributing to the delinquency of a
minor, a class B misdemeanor. R0014. On March 1, 2005, Kissell filed his Statement of
Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel, pleading guilty to five
4

(5) separate counts of dealing in harmful material to a minor pursuant to a plea agreement
with the State, with the remainder of the charges dismissed pursuant to plea negotiations.
Id.
On April 5, 2005, Kissell appeared for sentencing before the Honorable Lyle R.
Anderson of the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for Grand County, State of Utah.
At sentencing, Kissell was remorseful and apologized to the victim's family for what he
had done. Evidence was presented that Kissell had minimal prior criminal history, the
crimes committed were non-violent crimes, and he had appeared at all scheduled hearings
in this matter. Additionally, Kissell had maintained employment and had been a
productive member of the community. Many letters were written by his neighbors and
friends in support of Kissell, which evidenced a good reputation and a great job history.
The prosecution and defense counsel, as well as Adult Probation and Parole, who
had prepared a pre-sentence investigation report, believed that Kissell should receive
concurrent sentences. At the sentencing hearing, prior to entering the sentence, Judge
Anderson set forth the following analysis of factors he used in determining Kissell's
sentence:
THE COURT: You're - you're bisexual, Mr. Kissell, ah, so you're
aroused by the idea of sexual contact with people of either sex; ~
MR. KISSELL: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: —is that right?
MR. KISSELL: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Ah, but you understand that, ah most heter— well, all
heterosexuals, I think, prefer to be heterosexual, and - and probably a very
substantial portion of those people who, ah, are attracted to persons of the
same sex wish that were not the case because of they see the effect that it
has on their own lives and on their own families. And it's still difficult,
5

even in America today, to fit in with the templates of family life. Ah, even
as loose as they've become it's difficult for those people.
And I—I hear it all the time, you know: 'Do you think I would choose to be
this way? I must be born this way. No one would choose this,' so.
And then there's this controversy. Ah, do we need to keep people who are
attracted to persons of the same sex away from our children because they
may try to recruit our children?
And now you're a poster boy for those people who want to keep persons
attracted to people of the same sex away from their children. You're a
poster boy now for them, because you did exactly what everyone fears.
I don't think the most open minded parents out there would choose a
homosexual life over a heterosexual life for their children, ah, then - even if
they, once confronted it, they're accepting and -loving and caring. So this
is this is what bothers me about this the most is that, ah you're - you're not
only got involved with someone who's underage, but it was in a way that's
going to create and confuse - a very substantial likelihood of confused
sexual identity for this person.
Why am I? Why - why was I?
And you used - using heterosexual images to stir up sexual desire, and then
turning it to your own advantage. So I mean I - I think you have to
understand why the Keoughs must be absolutely furious with you.
MR. KISSELL: I do, your Honor.
THE COURT: Ah, I'm going to give you a prison sentence here and I'm
going to impose these terms consecutively to give the Board of Pardons the
option of keeping you for as long as 25 years, if you - if you're
stonewallin' on your treatment.
I - I have a concern, if I give a concurrent - if I give concurrent sentences
here, that you may reach a point where they're confronting you in your
treatment and you decide to just bail out of the treatment and survive five
years. I'm—I'm not gonna give you that option. So you're going to have
to be very consecutive and, ah, if they're - if they're willing to actually
hold your feet to the fire, ah, they'll - subject to the budget limitations that
they have, I'm sure, I'm gonna give 'em all the discretion they need to
make sure that you, ah - you not ever do this again. At least create the
greatest likelihood of that.
Sentencing Tr. at pp. 10-12. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sentenced
Kissell to five (5) zero to five (0-5) year terms to be served consecutively in the Utah
State Prison, and entered the Judgment in this matter. R0029.
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On July 14, 2006, having exhausted all potential appellate remedies, Kissell filed a
Petition for Relief Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act and a Memorandum in
Support of Petition for Relief Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act Act, challenging
that the trial court had relied upon irrelevant and unreliable evidence and information in
sentencing Appellant to consecutive terms, based on the above colloquy. R0005 and
R0013. On October 20, 2006, the trial court entered its Order denying Kissell's Petition.
R0032- R0033. On November 8, 2006, Kissell timely filed his Notice of Appeal from the
Order denying the Petition. R0035.
On June 8, 2007, Kissell filed his Brief of Appellant. The Utah Court of Appeals
remanded the appeal, directing the trial court to order the State to respond to the Petition.
On January 21, 2008, the State filed a Motion to Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief and Supporting Memorandum (the "Motion to Dismiss") R0060-R0163. On
March 26, 2008, Kissell filed his Response to the State's Motion to Dismiss Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief and Supporting Memorandum R0164-0179 and, on April 18,
2008, the State filed its State's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief R0180-0186.
On November 7, 2008 the State submitted its Notice to Submit State's Motion to
Dismiss Petition for Post-Conviction Relief R0186-0188. On November 24, 2008, the
Court filed the Order Dismissing Petition for Post Conviction Relief

R0189-192 On

December 17, 2008, Kissell timely filed his Notice of Appeal. R0193.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
I.

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AMEND. XIV
7

II.

UTAH CONSTITUTION ART. I § 7

III.

UTAH CONSTITUTION ART. I § 24

IV.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-401

V.

UT. R. Civ. P. 65C
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Trial courts are afforded wide latitude and discretion in sentencing. State v.
Moreno, 2005 UT App. 200, TJ8, 113 P.3d 992 citing State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, | 8 , 40
P.3d 626 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Moreno states as follows:
We will reverse only if we determine that a sentencing court has exceeded
its permitted range of discretion, or, stated differently, if we determine that
the trial court has "failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed
a sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d
454, 456 (Utah Ct.App.1993). Moreover, our decision is informed by the
understanding that "the exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily
reflects the personal judgment of the [trial] court and [we] can properly find
abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view
adopted by the trial court." Id. (first and third alterations in original)
(quotations and citation omitted).
Id.

The instant matter presents a challenge in reverse of this Court's customary reviews

on issues pertaining to abuse of discretion in ordering consecutive sentences. Rather than
a failure to consider all legally relevant factors, the trial court in Kissell's case
inappropriately considered nonrelevant factors with no legal basis, which are evidenced
in the colloquy on the record and should not have had a bearing on his sentencing. It is
clear that the trial court relied upon these inappropriate factors since it opted to deviate
from the State's recommendation for concurrent sentences.

While trial courts are

afforded wide latitude and discretion at sentencing, trial courts must stay within the

8

permitted range of discretion. Moreno at ^8. A trial court must consider all legally
relevant factors. Id. The trial court in this case exceeded its discretion by relying on
factors that were not legally relevant.
No other factors in aggravation supported the consecutive sentences given to
Kissell, who had several mitigating factors in favor of the State's recommendations.
Kissell did not require the trial court or the State to expend efforts in bringing him to trial,
but instead pled guilty. Kissell evidenced remorse and apologized in open court to the
victim and the victim's family for the crimes to which he pled, and placed himself at the
mercy of the trial court; however, he received a sentence similar to what he may have
received upon a guilty verdict at trial. The trial court in this matter exceeded its judicial
discretion in ordering consecutive sentences and thus the matter should be remanded and
Kissell afforded new sentencing in the matter.
"A court abuses its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences only if no
reasonable person would take the view by the sentencing court." State v. Thorkelson,
2004 UT App 9, 84 P.3d 854. The "reasonable person" standard is addressed regularly in
law pertaining to negligence and its defining of the term is assistive here. Under 57A
Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 133 (May 2009), the writers commented on the standard as
follows:
In dealing with the problem of judging an individual's behavior against
community standards, the law has made use of the standard of a
hypothetical "reasonable person." Sometimes this person is called a
reasonable person of ordinary prudence, or an ordinarily prudent person, or
a person of average prudence, or a person of reasonable sense exercising
reasonable care. It is evident that all such phrases are intended to mean

9

very much the same thing. The actor is required to do what this ideal
individual would do in his or her place.
Ibid., citing Restatement Second, Torts § 283, Comment c. The difficulty in applying the
"reasonable person" standard to a judge's sentencing determination is that a judge is no
ordinary person and is equipped with knowledge and experience far exceeding the
general population in the realm of sentencing. A "reasonable person" from the general
population may rely more on emotion for the crimes allegedly committed rather than the
unbiased experienced stance our judges take in such matters. It would thus be incorrect
to apply a typical "reasonable person" standard to a judge's determination in sentencing.
Rather, a judge's determination should be reviewed on a "reasonable person standard,"
but only one which bases that reasonableness upon what an ordinarily prudent judge
would do in the exercise of reasonable care, not a member of the general population.
Finally, Kissell's due process and equal protection rights were violated in
sentencing him consecutively. The Utah Court of Appeals has recently held that the
federal Equal Protection Clause embodies the general principle that "...persons similarly
situated should be treated similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not be
treated as if their circumstances were the same." State ex. rel. Z.C., 2005 UT App 562,
K8, 128 P.3d 561; U.S.C.A. CONST.AMEND. 14; U.C.A. CONST.ART. I § 24. The Utah
appellate courts have long recognized that "[concurrent sentences are favored over
consecutive ones." State v. Perez, 52 P.3d 451, TJ43, 2002 UT App 211; see, State v.
Gallt 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998).

In the instant matter, the sentencing violates

Kissell's right to equal protection and due process since the trial court undertook an
10

irrelevant and unreliable colloquy respecting bisexual versus heterosexual lifestyles,
attributing a greater degree of harm to the victim based upon Kissell's bisexual lifestyle
preference. Sentencing Tr. at pp. 10-12. Utah Code Annotated does not differentiate by
degrees of punishment the differences in sexual preference or the sex of the victims, and
to rely on such in sentencing was improper. Kissell should be afforded new sentencing in
the matter.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DEVIATING
FROM THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND RELYING ON
IRRELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES THAT IT INAPPROPRIATELY
DEEMED
AS
AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES
IN
SENTENCING KISSELL.
A. The "Reasonable Person Standard"
Determinations Requires Amendment.

Applied

to

Sentencing

Trial courts are afforded wide latitude and discretion in sentencing. State v.
Moreno, 2005 UT App. 200, ^8, 113 P.3d 992 citing State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12,1[8, 40
P.3d 626 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Moreno states as follows:
We will reverse only if we determine that a sentencing court has exceeded
its permitted range of discretion, or, stated differently, if we determine that
the trial court has "failed to consider all legally relevant factors, or imposed
a sentence that exceeds legally prescribed limits." State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d
454, 456 (Utah Ct.App.1993). Moreover, our decision is informed by the
understanding that "the exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily
reflects the personal judgment of the [trial] court and [we] can properly find
abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable [person] would take the view
adopted by the trial court." Id. (first and third alterations in original)
(quotations and citation omitted).
Id.

"A court abuses its discretion in imposing consecutive sentences only if no

reasonable person would take the view by the sentencing court." State v. Thorkelson,
11

2004 UT App 9, 84 P.3d 854. However, this typical "reasonable person" standard as
regularly applied in the law requires amendment when such standard is applied to a
judge's decision.
The "reasonable person" standard is addressed regularly in law pertaining to
negligence and a look to its definition of the term is assistive here. Under 57A Am.Jur.2d
Negligence § 133 (May 2009), the writers commented on the standard as follows:
In dealing with the problem of judging an individual's behavior against
community standards, the law has made use of the standard of a
hypothetical "reasonable person." Sometimes this person is called a
reasonable person of ordinary prudence, or an ordinarily prudent person, or
a person of average prudence, or a person of reasonable sense exercising
reasonable care. It is evident that all such phrases are intended to mean
very much the same thing. The actor is required to do what this ideal
individual would do in his or her place.
Ibid., citing Restatement Second, Torts § 283, Comment c. The difficulty in applying the
"reasonable person" standard to a judge's sentencing determination is that a judge is no
ordinary person and is equipped with knowledge and experience far exceeding the
general population in the realm of sentencing. A "reasonable person" from the general
population may rely more on emotion for the crimes allegedly committed rather than the
unbiased and experienced stance our judges take in such matters. It would thus be
incorrect to apply a typical "reasonable person" standard to a judge's determination in
sentencing. Rather, a judge's determination should be reviewed on a "reasonable person
standard," but only one which bases that reasonableness upon what an ordinarily prudent
judge would do in the exercise of reasonable care, not a member of the general
population.

12

Tracing the history of this "reasonable person" standard in Thorkelson and
Moreno supports this differing standard. Thorkelson relies upon a case determined nearly
thirty (30) years ago by our Utah Supreme Court titled State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885
(Utah 1978). Moreno traces to State v. Nuttall 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah App 1993),
which, in turn, relies upon Gerrard. In Gerrard, a challenge was made that the trial
court's sentence was based on an unreasonable interpretation of circumstances that
existed at the prior hearings. The Gerrard court turned to the Wyoming case ofHicklin v.
State, 535 P.2d 743 (Wyo. 1975), to adopt the "reasonable person" standard here in Utah
for sentencing matters; however, important language from Hicklin was lost throughout
the years. Hicklin was quoted in Gerrard as follows:
. . .a judgment in a criminal case will not be disturbed because of
sentencing procedures unless there is a showing of an abuse of discretion,
procedural conduct prejudicial to defendant, circumstances which manifest
inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense
of fair play...
Gerrard at 887, citing Hicklin at 751. Gerrard also turned to a Washington case, State v.
Harris, 10 Wash.App. 509, 518 P.2d 237 (1974), to indicate that "...the exercise of
discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal judgment of the court and the
appellate court can properly find abuse only if it can be said that no reasonable man
would take the view adopted by the trial court." Gerrard at 887, citing Harris, ibid.
In tracing the history of the "reasonable person" standard applied in reviewing
sentencing determinations, Harris relied upon State v. Hurst, 5 Wash.App. 146, 486 P.2d
1136 (Wash. App. 1971), which relied upon Rehak v. Rehak, 1 Wash.App. 963, 965, 435
P.2d 687 (1970), which interestingly is a divorce case. In Rehak, the Washington
13

appellate court noted that a "...judge does not have unfettered freedom to exercise his
personal judgment and may exercise his discretion only within certain broad guidelines."
This holding in Rehak was later overturned by the same appellate court in Coggle v.
Snow, 56 Wash.App. 499, 784 P.2d 554 (Wash.App. 1990), which stated that the
standard applied in Rehak for the exercise of judicial discretion was "imprudent." The
Coggle court noted that the Rehak court adopted a test from Delno v. Market St. Ry. Co.,
124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942), which stated that discretion was abused "when the
judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable" which the Coggle court recognized
as another way of saying that "discretion is abused only where no reasonable man would
take the view adopted by the trial court" (emphasis in the original), noting that "[i]f
reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then
it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion." Coggle at 559.
The Coggle court found this purported standard of abuse of discretion as one that
could not be applied and undertook an extensive analysis assistive of the current matter.
Id. Coggle5s analysis is as follows:
Instead of examining the reasons for the decision, this standard focuses on
the reasonableness of the decision-maker. But to say that an abuse of
discretion exists when "no reasonable man, woman or judge" would have
taken the view adopted by the trial court is not accurate. It cannot justly be
said that every trial judge reversed by the appellate court or Supreme Court
for an abuse of discretion is less reasonable than the reversing judges. "An
experienced and reasonable trial judge does not suddenly become
'unreasonable' on a particular day." State v. Creekmore, 55 Wash.App.
852, 875, 783 P.3d 1068 (1989)(Forrest, J., concurring). Strict application
of such a standard would mean that an appellate court would never reverse
without a hearing to determine the general reasonableness of the judge.
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In State ex. rel Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wash.2d 12, 482 P.2d 775 (1971), the
Supreme Court sought to temper the "reasonable man" standard:
Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among
which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means
a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or
capriciously.... Where the decision or order of the trial court
is a matter of discretion, it will not be disturbed on review
except on a clear showing of abuse of discretion, that is,
discretion manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable
grounds, or for untenable reasons.
Junker at 26, 482 P.2d 775. Nevertheless, numerous decisions since 1971
have persisted in applying the Delno-Rehak standard, sometimes
juxtaposing it with the Junker standard. E.g. Singleton v. Frost, 108
Wash.2d 723, 730, 742 P.2d 1224 (1987). We take this occasion to
disapprove the Delno-Rehak standard. The proper standard is whether
discretion is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons,
considering the purposes of the trial court's discretion.
Ibid, at 506-507.
According to Merriam-Webster online, the word "untenable" means "not able to
be defended." http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/untenable (May 28, 2009).
The Cambridge Dictionary online defines "untenable" as an adjective that "describes a
theory or argument that cannot be supported or defended against criticism" or "describes
a situation that cannot continue as it is." http://dictionary.cambridge.org (May 28, 2009).
Under YourDictionary.com, the term "untenable" is defined as "that cannot be held,
defended or maintained" setting forth synonyms as "indefensible, unsupportable,
unreasonable,

unsound,

flawed;

see

also

illogical."

http://www.yourdictionarv.com/untenable (May 28, 2009).
The standard in Gerrard has been applied for nearly thirty (30) years in Utah, with
our appellate courts relying on its precepts for determination of cases not selected for
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publication. However, the history of such standard evidences that it was overturned by
the originating court nearly nineteen (19) years ago in favor of a standard which did not
require a look to the reasonableness of the judge on a regular person standard, but rather
his actions in exercising the discretion given him. As stated by the Washington appellate
courts on review of its own standard, it determined that "[t]he proper standard is whether
discretion is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons, considering the
purposes of the trial court's discretion." Coggle at 507. It is not whether the judge's
determination itself is untenable, but rather whether the grounds or reasoning upon which
he relied were untenable.
Coggle also suggests a consideration of the purpose behind the trial court's
discretion. The purpose of the judge's discretion in sentencing is based uponhis expertise
and experience in sentencing individuals regularly brought before the court. This Court
has granted the trial courts wide latitude in sentencing for this purpose, recognizing that
these sentencing decisions reflect the personal judgments of the trial court itself. Moreno
at ^8. However, if a decision is based upon grounds or reasons that are untenable, or
indefensible, unsupportable, unreasonable, unsound, flawed, or illogical, then it deprives
the defendant of the ability to obtain adequate review of such determination.
This Court should thus apply the standard as set forth in Coggle to its review of
this matter, effectively overturning the Utah Supreme Court's prior decision in Gerrard,
and its progeny, to adequately address the challenges in this matter. If this Court is
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without the ability to do so , Kissell respectfully requests that the matter be certified to
the Utah Supreme Court for determination. The necessity of doing so is evidenced in
Kissell's challenges set forth more particularly below.
B. The Trial Court Relied Upon Untenable Grounds and Reasons When
Sentencing Kissell to Consecutive Sentences.
This Court has determined, "[t]he trial court is charged with identifying, on the
record, the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that affect its sentencing decision,
because '[sentencing should be conducted with full information and with careful
deliberation of all relevant factors.'" Id. at ]flO citing State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297,
1300 (Utah 1993). This Court has also determined, "...in the absence of any express
findings regarding proffered mitigating or aggravating circumstances, we will conclude
that the trial court, by implication, found that the proffered circumstances did not amount
to circumstances in aggravation or mitigation[.]" State v. Malaga, 2006 UT App. 103,
1J27, 132 P.3d 703 citing Moreno at If 18.
At sentencing in the instant matter, the following statements were recorded on the
record:
THE COURT: You're - you're bisexual, Mr. Kissell, ah, so you're
aroused by the idea of sexual contact with people of either sex; —
MR. KISSELL. Yes, sir.
THE COURT: —is that right?
MR. KISSELL: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Ah, but you understand that, ah most heter- -- well, all
heterosexuals, I think, prefer to be heterosexual, and - and probably a very
substantial portion of those people who, ah, are attracted to persons of the
same sex wish that were not the case because of they see the effect that it
There is some question as to whether certification is necessary since the Utah Court of Appeals did not exist when
Gerrard was entered, so the Utah Supreme Court sat as the first and only level reviewing court for Gerrard in the
State of Utah at the time.
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has on their own lives and on their own families. And it's still difficult,
even in America today, to fit in with the templates of family life. Ah, even
as loose as they've become it's difficult for those people.
And I—I hear it all the time, you know: 'Do you think I would choose to be
this way? I must be born this way. No one would choose this,' so.
And then there's this controversy. Ah, do we need to keep people who are
attracted to persons of the same sex away from our children because they
may try to recruit our children?
And now you're a poster boy for those people who want to keep persons
attracted to people of the same sex away from their children. You're a
poster boy now for them, because you did exactly what everyone fears.
I don't think the most open minded parents out there would choose a
homosexual life over a heterosexual life for their children, ah, then - even if
they, once confronted it, they're accepting and -loving and caring. So this
is this is what bothers me about this the most is that, ah you're - you're not
only got involved with someone who's underage, but it was in a way that's
going to create and confuse - a very substantial likelihood of confused
sexual identity for this person.
Why am I? Why - why was I?
And you used - using heterosexual images to stir up sexual desire, and then
turning it to your own advantage. So I mean I - I think you have to
understand why the Keoughs must be absolutely furious with you.
MR. KISSELL: I do, your Honor.
THE COURT: Ah, I'm going to give you a prison sentence here and I'm
going to impose these terms consecutively to give the Board of Pardons the
option of keeping you for as long as 25 years, if you - if you're
stonewallin' on your treatment.
I - I have a concern, if I give a concurrent - if I give concurrent sentences
here, that you may reach a point where they're confronting you in your
treatment and you decide to just bail out of the treatment and survive five
years. I'm—I'm not gonna give you that option. So you're going to have
to be very consecutive and, ah, if they're - if they're willing to actually
hold your feet to the fire, ah, they'll - subject to the budget limitations that
they have, I'm sure, I'm gonna give 6em all the discretion they need to
make sure that you, ah - you not ever do this again. At least create the
greatest likelihood of that.
Sentencing Tr. at pp. 10-12. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sentenced
Kissell to five (5) zero to five (0-5) year terms to be served consecutively in the Utah
State Prison, and entered the Judgment in this matter. R0029.
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Kissell did not file a direct appeal from the Judgment; however, he did file the
Petition at issue herein, which argued the sentence was improper in that it was based
upon irrelevant and unreliable evidence and violated his right to equal protection. The
trial court simply denied the Petition without response from the State. Kissell thus
appealed the denial and this Court remanded with direction to the State to respond to the
Petition. After the State's Motion to Dismiss and Kissell's response thereto, the trial court
dismissed the Petition. Kissell thus filed his Notice of Appeal from the dismissal of the
Petition.
While trial courts are afforded wide latitude and discretion at sentencing, trial
courts must stay within the permitted range of discretion. Moreno at ^8. A trial court
must consider all legally relevant factors. Id. As argued supra, "[t]he proper standard is
whether discretion is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons,
considering the purposes of the trial court's discretion." Coggle at 507. The trial court in
this case exceeded its discretion by relying on factors that were not legally relevant and
thus deprived Kissell of the ability to defend against them. The trial court relied on
Kissell's bisexual tendencies and their affect upon the victim to impose consecutive
sentences. While the exercise of discretion in sentencing necessarily reflects the personal
judgment of the trial court, to rely on these tendencies as a factor to impose consecutive
sentences is inappropriate. Id. Such grounds or reasoning was untenable and thus
improper on which to base a sentence.
The sentencing in this case was not conducted with careful deliberation of all
relevant factors. This Court must assume that, in light of the lack of express findings
19

regarded aggravating circumstances, the circumstances did not amount to circumstances
in aggravation. Malaga at ^[27. The trial court erred in denying the Petition, which
challenges the sentencing in this matter as relying on improper and unreliable factors;
hence, the circumstances leading to the sentencing are pertinent in this matter.
As further support, Kissell pled guilty and subjected himself to the mercy of the
court, only to receive the harshest sentence within the trial court's discretion. In State v.
Patience, the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows:
"[t]he nature of plea bargains requires the exchange of consideration,
allowing the parties involved to reach a mutually desirable agreement. A
plea bargain is a contractual relationship in which consideration is passed."
Id. The court continued by stating: "A plea bargain does not involve a
situation where a defendant willingly pleads guilty to a crime, neither
asking nor expecting anything in return." Id.
Ibid., 944 P.2d 381, 386 (Utah App,1997)(Emphasis added), citing State v. West, 765
P.2d 891, 896 (Utah 1988). "It would be ... implausible to assume that defendant would
have bargained to plead guilty expecting nothing in return." Patience at 386, citing West
at 896.
In the instant matter, Kissell entered a guilty plea to five (5) counts of Dealing in
Harmful Material to a Minor, third degree felonies, and was sentenced to five (5) zero-tofive year terms to run consecutively. Although it is within the trial court's discretion to a
sentence a defendant as they deem fit and they do not have to abide by the
recommendations of the State, Kissell anticipated that by pleading guilty the court would
show some mercy, particularly given his limited criminal history and his evident remorse
for the victim and the victim's family. The entire purpose of a plea agreement is that, by
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admitting culpability and taking responsibility for the crime, the court would exercise
mercy on a defendant. "...[Ajfter initial charges have been filed, the vast majority of
courts permit, encourage, or require some degree of judicial discretion in accepting or
rejecting such arrangements." State v. Montiel 2005 UT 48, |12, 122 P.3d 571. In the
criminal system, defendants are encouraged to plead by the idea that a court will likely be
merciful in its sentencing since they avoid the time, efforts, energy and costs involved in
bringing the matter to trial. Additionally, a plea is a factor in mitigation based on
acceptance of one's responsibility in the matter, and should be taken into consideration
when determining what sentence should be given. However, the trial court in this matter
exercised no mercy but gave Kissell what amounts to the harshest sentence within its
discretion.
The Utah Supreme Court has determined, "[w]e generally adhere to the
proposition that, subject to constitutional constraints, '[t]he Executive remains the
absolute judge of whether a prosecution should be initiated and the first and
presumptively best judge of whether a pending prosecution should be terminated.'" Id. at
Tfl2 citing United States v. Cowan. 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir.1975); see United States v.
Armstrong. 517 U.S. 456, 464, 116 S.Ct. 1480, 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996). Montiel
continues by stating that, "[p]lea bargains, however, implicate not only the ordinarily
plenary executive power to indict or dismiss; they also 'go to the traditionally judicial
function of determining what penalty to impose.'" Ibid., citing United States v. Escobar
Noble, 653 F.2d 34, 37 (1st Cir.1981); see also United States v. Torres-Echavarria, 129
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F.3d 692, 696 (2d Cir.1997).

However, trial courts may not reject a guilty plea

arbitrarily. Id. at ^f 14 ("courts should be wary of second-guessing prosecutorial choices").
In the instant matter, the trial court deviated from the State's recommendation of
concurrent sentences and instead imposed the sentences consecutively. While not
challenged in this appeal, the purpose behind the plea bargain is necessary for this
Court's understanding that, had Kissell proceeded to trial and been convicted, he would
surely have expected a harsher sentence. Instead, in entering into a plea agreement with
the State, he placed himself at the mercy of the trial court and received a sentence similar
to what he may have received upon a guilty verdict at trial. This is further support for the
fact that the trial court relied upon untenable grounds and reasons for imposing
consecutive sentences. No circumstances in aggravation supported such determination.
The State, subject to constitutional restraints, remains the absolute best judge of
what penalties should be imposed through the exercise of their plea bargaining powers.
Id. As such a judge, the State takes on the traditionally judicial function of recommending
an appropriate sentence. Id. Such practice is permitted, encouraged, and requires some
degree of judicial discretion in accepting or rejecting such arrangements. Id.
court

should

have

exercised

restraint

and

only

deviated

from

the

The trial
State's

recommendations based upon appropriate grounds or reasoning. The Court in this matter
clearly did not exercise such restraint, as evidenced by its inappropriate colloquy on the
record in this matter.
The trial court relied upon untenable grounds and reasons in its sentencing Kissell
to consecutive terms in this matter. The trial court did not indicate on the record that the
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information contained in the colloquy was a factor in aggravation, but it contained
information that Kissell cannot adequately defend against since it has no legal basis and
resulted in a sentence that is not outside the guidelines. It is clear from a reading of the
colloquy that it implicates factors not standardly relied upon by sentencing courts and not
commonly reviewed by appellate courts. The trial court was given the opportunity to
overturn its prior sentence by the filing of the Petition in this matter, but chose not to do
so. Kissell simply requests an opportunity for re-sentencing where untenable grounds
and reasons are not relied upon during such sentencing.
II.

THE JUDGMENT VIOLATES APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO EQUAL
PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS.

The Utah Court of Appeals has recently held that the federal Equal Protection
Clause embodies the general principle that "...persons similarly situated should be treated
similarly, and persons in different circumstances should not be treated as if their
circumstances were the same." State ex. rel. Z.C., 2005 UT App 562, ^|8, 128 P.3d 561;
U.S.C.A. CONST.AMEND. 14; U.C.A. CONST.ART. I § 24. The Utah appellate courts have
long recognized that "[concurrent sentences are favored over consecutive ones." State v.
Perez, 52 P.3d 451, | 4 3 , 2002 UT App 211; see, State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah
1998).

UT. CODE ANN.

§76-3-401 sets forth the following with respect to the trial

court's authority to impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences:
A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive
sentences for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall
indicate in the order of judgment and commitment: (a) if the sentences
imposed are to run concurrently or consecutively to each other; and (b) if
the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with
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any other sentences the defendant is already serving. (2) In determining
whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the court
shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of
victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the
defendant.
In State v. Wanosik, the Utah Court of Appeals held that, "[t]he due process clause
of Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, requires that a sentencing judge act on
reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing a
sentence." Ibid., 2001 UT App 241, |34, 31 P.3d 615, citing State v. Howell 707 P.2d
115, 118 (Utah 1985). The Utah Court of Appeals has recognized that "...a criminal
defendant's right to be sentenced based on relevant and reliable information regarding his
crime, his background, and the interests of society stands independent of Utah Rule of
Criminal Procedure 22(a)." Wanosik, supra. "A sentence in a criminal case should be
appropriate for the defendant in light of his background and the crime committed and also
serve the interests of society which underlie the criminal justice system." Wanosik,
citing State v. McClendon. 611 P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1980). '"[T]he sentencing judge[
][has] discretion in determining what punishment fits both the crime and the offender,'
but [the Utah appellate courts] have consistently sought 'to shore up the soundness and
reliability of the factual basis upon which the judge must rely in the exercise of that
sentencing discretion.'" Id, citing State v. Lipskv, 608 P.2d 1241, 1249 (Utah 1980)
(requiring disclosure of presentence report to defendant prior to sentencing).
In the instant matter, the sentence imposed violates KisselPs right to equal
protection and due process. Kissell was not treated as those who had been in a similar
situation were. The trial court undertook an irrelevant and unreliable colloquy respecting
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bisexual versus heterosexual lifestyles, attributing a greater degree of harm to the victim
based upon KisselPs bisexual lifestyle preference. Sentencing Tr. at pp. 10-12. The trial
court reiterated this in the Order denying the Petition when it stated that it viewed the acts
at issue herein with a greater degree of harm stating that, "[t]he victim of petitioner was
of the same sex as petitioner, which has made the victim's trauma even greater and
recovery more problematic." See, Addendum "A." While a judge is authorized and
expected to undertake moral judgments in our society with respect to actions taken by
individuals, those actions are typically attributable to crime and punishment on the basis
that they are determined to be illegal or against the greater moral conscience by ruling of
our legislative body in codifying such on our behalves.
The trial court did not impose a sentence that was appropriate for Kissell in light
of his background and the crime committed while also serving the interests of society.
Wanosik at f34. Utah Code Annotated does not differentiate by degrees of punishment
the differences in sexual preference or the sex of the victims, and to rely on such in
sentencing was improper.

While Kissell's actions with respect to the victim were

codified as illegal based upon the age of the victim, Judge Anderson's colloquy clearly
indicates that age was not the only determining factor in ordering consecutive sentences,
evidencing possible partiality, prejudice, impropriety or ill will towards Kissell. Hence,
the trial court in this matter exceeded its discretion in imposing a consecutive sentence particularly since concurrent sentences are favored over consecutive ones - and in failing
to rely on relevant evidence to support the sentence. Perez at ^|43 and Wanosik at f34.
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In Utah, there are many cases where the defendants were charged with the same
crime to which Kissell pled guilty, but who received either lesser sentences or probation
and a fine. In State v. Haltom, Haltom was found guilty of selling an adult video to
minor and was convicted of dealing harmful material to a minor and sentenced to 0-5
years, which sentence was suspended and he was ordered to serve thirty (30) days and
probation. Ibid., 2005 UT App 348, 121 P.3d 42. In State v. Brown, the defendant was
convicted of showing a pornographic video to a minor, and the trial court sentenced him
to five years imprisonment and imposed a $5000.00 fine. 856 P.2d 358 (Utah App.,1993).
The trial court in Brown's case then stayed the sentence, placing defendant on probation
subject to his serving the fourteen (14) day minimum mandatory sentence and abiding by
other probation conditions. Id. Another example is found in State v. Vigil, where Vigil
was convicted of dealing harmful material to a minor and was fined $12,650 and
sentenced to two terms of 0-5 years in the Utah State Prison and one (1) year in the Davis
County Jail to be served concurrently, (emphasis added);.

840 P.2d 788 (Utah

App., 1992).
It appears in Utah, that consecutive sentences are typically imposed only in
situations where a violent crime accompanies the charge of dealing in harmful material to
a minor. For example, in State v. Helms, the trial court sentenced Helms to three (3)
years to life in prison for both counts of aggravated sexual assault and zero-to-five years
in prison for each of the three (3) counts of dealing in harmful material to a child. Ibid.,
2002 UT 12, 40 P.3d 626. The Helms trial court ordered that Helms serve the five (5)
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sentences consecutively, obviously based on the trial court's concern that Helms was a
threat to the safety of the community.
In the cases listed supra, Haltom, Vigil and Brown were either given concurrent
sentences or put on probation for committing similar crimes to the ones at issue herein.
Only in a violent crime situation such as Helms has a similar punishment been afforded
to someone guilty of the crimes at issue herein. Kissell was unreasonably sentenced to up
to (25) twenty-five years in prison for a crime that was non-violent when he did not have
any previous criminal history and was apologetic and remorseful for what had occurred.
Because Kissell had committed the same crime as the cases cited supra, but received
excessive punishment for such, his equal protection rights have been violated. U.S.C.A.
CONST.AMEND. 14; U.C.A. CONST.ART. I § 24. Kissell was sentenced more severely than
those similarly situated to him. Z.C. at TJ8.
Kissell's due process rights were violated because the trial court did not rely on
evidence that was reliable or reasonable in making their decision to sentence Kissell to
consecutive sentences. No evidence was presented at sentencing that showed that Kissell
would "stonewall" on his rehabilitation and not be quickly and effectively rehabilitated.
In fact, the opposite appears to be more accurate. Before even entering treatment, Kissell
had shown that he was amendable to rehabilitation by his apology to the victim and the
victim's family, his remorsefulness, and his cooperative behavior. Instead of receiving
acknowledgment for the steps he had taken towards rehabilitation on his own, he was
unjustly laden with a sentence that could keep him in prison for up to twenty-five (25)
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years. This sentence was based upon an assumption that he would "stonewall" on his
treatment and not be rehabilitated when no such character evidence was ever presented.
The trial court also appears to have given Kissell consecutive sentences because of
his admission that he was bisexual and the same-sex nature of the victim in the matter.
This admission seems to have planted a seed in the court's mind that, because of these
tendencies, Kissell would be harder to rehabilitate and may "stonewall" on his treatment,
causing the court to feel that he possibly needed to be put away for a long period of time.
Again, no evidence was presented to show that this was the case. It is clear that the intent
behind UT. CODE ANN. §76-3-401 was to allow the trial court to utilize relevant and
reliable information in sentencing, while recognizing that concurrent sentences are
favored. See, Perez and GalH, supra. Kissell's due process rights were violated by
failure to take into consideration relevant and reliable information in determining the
sentence. In this case, the punishment does not fit the crime or the offender. See,
Wanosik.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Kissell respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the trial court's denial of his Petition, set aside his current consecutive
sentences, and remand this matter for more appropriate sentencing.
DATED THIS 29th day of June, 2009.

K. Andrew Fitzgerald
Attorney for Michael William Kissell
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In accordance with direction from the Utah Court of Appeals,
this court had the petition of Michael William Kissell
("Kissell") served on the State of Utah (the "State"), with
instructions that the State file a response.
Motion to Dismiss on February 25, 2008.
response on March 26, 2008.
April 18, 2008.

x

The State filed a

Kissell filed his

The State filed its reply on

On November 7, 2008, the State submitted its

motion for decision.
The State asserts that Kissell's petition must be dismissed
because it is barred by Section 78-35a-107(1), Utah Code (2004).
It is not disputed that the petition was filed more than one year
after it accrued, which was May 5, 2005.

The State also asserts
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filed in that case.
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that the petition is procedurally barred because the claims
raised in the petition could have been raised on appeal.

There

is no question that, had Kissell appealed his sentence, he could
have raised every issue raised in this petition.
Kissell first responds that the petition is not frivolous on
its face.

This court agrees that the mandate from the Utah Court

of Appeals implicitly includes a determination that the petition
is not frivolous on its face. However, that the petition is not
frivolous on its face does not mean that it necessarily survives
a motion to dismiss.
The only argument asserted by Kissell with respect to the
State's procedural defense is that Kissell did not know of his
claim when the direct appeal could have been filed.

However, the

only support offered for this assertion is that Kissell didn't
appeal.

As the State notes, if this court accepted that

assertion, no post conviction claim not raised on appeal could
ever be procedurally barred.

The law requires more than this,

i.e. some showing that unusual circumstances justify allowing
Kissell to pursue claims he could have raised on direct appeal.
Because Kissell has offered no support for his claim that he did
not know he could pursue his claims on direct appeal, this court
is forced to determine that those claims are barred.

2

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Kissell's petition is dismissed,
No further order is required.

Dated this

2C

day of November, 2 008.

Lyle R. Anderson, District Judge
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